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I. INTRODUCTION
The employment of every new worker is the result of a two-stage process:
recruitment of applicants and selection from the applicant pool. A personnel officer
may evaluate only John and Jane Worker because Juan and Juanita Worker are not in
the applicant pool. What active or passive acts by the company establish the applicant
pool? The issue becomes particularly troublesome when Juan and Juanita Worker are
members of one minority group and John and Jane Worker are members of another
racial or ethnic minority group. May employers legally recruit more actively from one
group than another? One federal district court recently held no.'
The case law under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,2 which prohibits
discrimination in employment on the basis of race, sex, or national origin, generally
has not recognized the divisibility of recruitment and selection. The case law has
established that the evaluation of applicants must result in a work force that generally
reflects the composition of the relevant labor market, or the employer must prove the
business necessity of the excluding selection procedures. 3 Courts have assumed that
the labor market comparison covers comprehensively both selection and recruitment
of John, Jane, Juan or Juanita, but refinements in the concept of "relevant" labor
market can make that assumption unfounded. 4
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1. EEOC v. Chicago Miniature Lamp Works, 622 F. Supp. 1281 (N.D. II. 1985). Blacks were underrepresented
in the company and hispanics were overrepresented because of word-of-mouth method of recruitment.
This issue has appeared in a remedial context as well. In County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625 (1979), the
class of plaintiffs included both blacks and Mexican-American applicants for city firefighter positions. The district court's
remedial hiring order required at least 20% of all new firefighters to be black and another 20% to be Mexican-American
until the percentage of blacks and Mexican-Americans in the department was commensurate with the percentage of each
group in the county. The Supreme Court notes that the district court ordered identical accelerated hiring for both blacks
and Mexican-Americans notwithstanding the fact that the Mexican-American population in the county was approximately
double the size of the black population. Id. at 630 n.2. The court of appeals rejected this procedure and ordered a relative
increase in the Mexican-American hiring quota. The Supreme Court found it unnecessary to consider that issue since the
case was dismissed for mootness.
2. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2000e-17 (1982). Title VII provides, in part, that it is an unlawful employment practice for
an employer to "fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual
with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1982).
3. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440,446-47 (1982)(citing Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424,432 (1971)).
4. See, e.g., Markey v. Tenneco, 707 F.2d 172 (5th Cir. 1983). The relevant labor market was refined to reflect
the weighted percentage of workers from each area of the city. The court reasoned that, absent discriminatory recruitment
practices, the percentage of applicants from each area of the city is probative of the willingness of individuals from those
areas to travel to the employer's work site. Id. at 173. The court then reviewed the evidence of discrimination in
recruitment and found it unpersuasive. Id. This issue is likely to become increasingly litigated because of the trend for
new jobs to be located in the suburbs rather than in the inner city areas where a disproportionately large number of blacks
reside. See also A Nation Apart, U.S. Nrws & Wvopun RsroTr, March 17, 1986, at 20.
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Several cases have noted that a word-of-mouth method of recruiting applicants
through existing employees can have a disparate impact5 on minorities when the work
force is predominantly white.6 The word-of-mouth recruitment in those cases is used
merely to corroborate other evidence of exclusion, however, and is not clearly
characterized as a violation of the Act by itself.7 In some cases posing recruitment
problems, courts have failed to squarely address the issue.8 Most recently the Ninth
Circuit has struggled with the lack of clear precedent for the analysis of recruitment
methods. 9 In one opinion, the court expressed uncertainty about whether to use
disparate treatment or disparate impact analysis for recruitment practices. Because
intentional discrimination was found in the first of the cases, it was unnecessary to
resolve the issue. 10 Subsequently, another panel of the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit held that intentional discrimination must be proven for all cases challenging
practices and policies that lack well-defined criteria.lI Included in that category was
word-of-mouth recruitment. Other types of recruitment practices were not men-
tioned.' 2 That opinion was then vacated and reheard en banc.13
Several questions in this area remain unanswered. Are all methods of recruit-
ment employment "practices" covered by Title VII? Which practices, if any, may be
subject to disparate impact analysis? Is racially conscious recruitment prohibited
5. Title VII claims based upon "disparate impact" should be distinguished from claims of "unequal treatment,"
which is also called "disparate treatment." The similarity in the names of these dissimilar theories of recovery under Title
VII is the unfortunate result of haphazard nomenclature. Neither of these terms is defined by, nor even appears in, the
Act itself. "Disparate treatment" has been used to mean an employer's unequal policy or practice which differentiates
between two groups solely on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. A disparate treatment claim
requires proof of the employer's discriminatory motive, although sometimes motive can be inferred from the facts
showing inequality in treatment. On the other hand, "disparate impact" refers to discriminatory results of neutral
practices regardless of the employer's motive. The phrases "disparate impact," "adverse impact," and "disproportionate
exclusion" are used interchangeably. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335 n.15
(1977); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). See also Wright v. National Archives and Records Serv., 609
F.2d 702 (4th Cir. 1979).
6. See, e.g., EEOC v. American Nat'l Bank, 652 F.2d 1176 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 923 (1982);
Taylor v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 524 F.2d 263, 271-72 (10th Cir. 1975); Gresham v. Chambers, 501 F.2d 687 (2d Cir.
1974); United States v. Georgia Power Co., 474 F.2d 906, 925-26 (5th Cir. 1973); Parham v. Southwestern Bell Tel.
Co., 433 F.2d 421,427 (8th Cir. 1970). But cf. Wilkens v. University of Houston, 654 F.2d 388, 399-400 (5th Cir. 1981)
(word-of-mouth recruiting not as harmful to women for academic job as it was for blue collar black workers in Georgia
Power).
7. See Diggs v. Western Elec. Co., 587 F.2d 1070, 1072 (10th Cir. 1978). The Tenth Circuit found that a racially
balanced work force eliminated any adverse inference which might arise from word-of-mouth recruiting. The case
involved an individual claim of intentional discrimination in hiring, and did not present an opportunity for thoughtful
analysis of word-of-mouth recruiting practices. It is unclear why the court-thought that the balanced work force eliminated
the adverse inference from the recruitment. The court could have made its comment on three different bases: (1) the court
may have erroneously believed before Teal, 457 U.S. 440 (1982), that a good bottom line was a defense; (2) the court
may have concluded from the general evidence that there was no disparate impact; or (3) the court may simply have
concluded that the good bottom line effectively dispelled the inference that the employer had intentionally discriminated.
8. See discussion of Furnco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978) at text accompanying notes 55-67 infra.
9. Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 768 F.2d 1120 (9th Cir. 1985); Domingo v. New England Fish Co., 727
F.2d 1429 (9th Cir.), modified, 742 F.2d 521 (9th Cir. 1984).
10. See Domingo v. New England Fish Co., 727 F.2d 1429, 1435 (9th Cir. 1984).
11. Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 768 F.2d 1120 (9th Cir. 1985).
12. Id. at 1133. The court did clarify that nepotism allegations are proper for disparate impact analysis.
13. 787 F.2d 462 (9th Cir. 1986). After this Article went to press, the Ninth Circuit issued an opinion, reported
at 810 F.2d 1477, that reverses the prior decision. Atonio now holds that subjective criteria may be subject to disparate
impact analysis if the plaintiff can establish the causal connection between the impact and the practice. The application
of the causal connection requirement to restrictive recruitment practices effectively establishes a "bottom line defense"
which this Article criticizes. See infra text accompanying notes 95-99.
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except under a bona fide affirmative action plan?14 Can a plaintiff establish a prima
facie case by showing that an employer recruits in a manner that disproportionately
excludes a group protected by the Act, but that the employer nonetheless has a work
force representative of the composition of the relevant labor market? If recruitment
methods are indeed employment practices within the meaning of the Act, what
defenses are available to employers?' 5
The answers to these questions may affect existing recruitment practices. One
employer, a television station, requires all applicants to be from a formerly affiliated
radio station.t 6 Another company requires all applicants to be known personally to
the hiring supervisor.' 7 Others recruit from selected colleges.' 8 Some engage in no
active recruitment but simply accept walk-in applications and fill positions as they
occur. Some employers do not consider applications from walk-ins unless there is a
current vacancy. This timing requirement is often unknown to applicants, who
reasonably believe that they have filed an active application that will be considered
when a vacancy occurs.19
This Article examines the types of cases involving recruitment issues and
proposes a model for analyzing recruitment practices. The model distinguishes
between restrictive recruitment practices, such as admitting applicants from a single
source or requiring applications at a single time, and open recruitment practices,
where an employer is willing to accept and consider all applications. Restrictive
practices are those where the source of the application becomes virtually an
employment requirement; the application is not considered unless it comes from an
acceptable source or at an acceptable time. Thus, they should be treated by the same
legal standards as selection requirements.
This Article concludes that open recruitment from multiple sources should not be
a violation of the Act in itself, even when one of the components, such as
word-of-mouth recruitment, has an adverse impact on a group protected by the Act.
Absent a showing that the employer intended to exclude with such a component, open
recruitment practices should be merged with selection procedures for determining
whether there has been a violation of the Act. Conversely, restrictive recruitment
practices are separate objective employment practices that should violate Title VII if
there is an adverse impact, unless the employer can justify the practice with business
necessity. The bottom line defense should not be available for recruitment practices,
as it is not for selection practices. 20 The defense of business necessity, however,
should be viewed more liberally for recruitment practices than for selection practices.
14. The Supreme Court held in United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 192 (1979) that a bona fide
affirmative action plan does not violate the Act.
15. The Supreme Court created the business necessity defense for disparate impact hiring cases. See Albemarle
Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431 (1971).
16. See infra discussion of EEOC v. New York Times Broadcasting Serv., Inc., 542 F.2d 356 (6th Cir. 1976), at
text accompanying notes 87-88.
17. See infra discussion of Fumco Constr. Co. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978), at notes 55-67 and accompanying
text.
18. See, e.g., Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977).
19. See infra text accompanying notes 93-94.
20. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 442-46 (1982).
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A large percentage increase in the cost of processing applicants should be sufficient
to establish the business necessity defense. 21 The goal of employment discrimination
law is to eliminate unjustified barriers, but small gains in application opportunity do
not merit unlimited cost.
I1. PROBLEMS WITH RECRUITMENT PRACTICES
A. Recruitment Divisible from Hiring Practices
Consider a hypothetical employer, 22 Standard Company, located in a predom-
inantly black neighborhood in an inner city with substantial black and hispanic
populations. Standard refuses to take walk-in applications. Instead, Standard engages
in active recruitment for entry level jobs at high schools in the white suburbs.
Standard also recruits, pursuant to an affirmative action plan, in selected city high
schools. Recent applicants and hirees reflect the racial composition of the metropol-
itan area. Is Standard immune from Title VII liability? If walk-in applications were
allowed, blacks in the immediately surrounding neighborhood might well apply in
numbers greater than their representation in the metropolitan area.23
Standard would have an incentive under current law not to accept walk-in
applications if Standard feared that such applicants would be both disproportionately
black and less qualified than the workers recruited at the selected high schools.
Wholly aside from racial animus or racial goodwill, Standard would want to avoid the
imbalance caused by too many rejected minority applicants. An employer today who
wishes to minimize the chance of a discrimination lawsuit will seek to have an
applicant flow that shows the same rate of selection for all groups24 and to have a
work force that mirrors the composition of the metropolitan area. 25 Thus, under
current law, Standard presumably can recruit and hire from selected high schools, a
surreptitious method of imposing a diploma requirement, without fear that it will have
to prove in court the job relatedness of such a procedure.
Assume that Potter, a black who lives near hypothetical Standard, walked into
the company and asked for an application. The receptionist politely responded that no
applications were being taken. With persistence, Potter finally saw the personnel
manager. Potter said that he had dropped out of high school and wanted a job,
perhaps as a janitor. The officer, well briefed by counsel, said nothing about the
desirability of a high school diploma and simply responded that applications were not
21. See infra text accompanying notes 110-113.
22. For cases that are factually related to this hypothetical, see Aguilera v. Cook County Merit Bd., 21 Fair
Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 731 (N.D. Ill. 1979), rev'd and remanded, 661 F.2d 937 (7th Cir. 1981), dismissed, 582 F.
Supp. 1053 (N.D. II1. 1984).
23. For a case in which the percentage of blacks among applicants was substantially greater than black
representation in the Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area (SMSA), see Davis v. City of Dallas, 483 F. Supp. 54, 57
(N.D. Tex. 1979), motion to reconsider denied with opinion, 487 F. Supp. 389 (N.D. Tex. 1980).
24. The Federal Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, 41 C.F.R. § 60-3.4(D) (1980), rely upon
applicant flow to evaluate the impact of hiring requirements.
25. See International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977). In that case, the Supreme Court
first articulated the principle that the work force of a nondiscriminating employer is expected over time to more or less
reflect the community from which employees are drawn.
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being taken. Potter learned shortly after this encounter that a number of new janitors
without prior experience were hired at Standard after his inquiry. They were recruited
from selected high schools. Potter wants to sue.
Potter has no individual claim of disparate treatment because he did not apply for
the job, and application is the crucial first step of proof. 26 Potter also has no claim of
intentional unequal treatment of a group defined by race because the facts indicate
that the rule prohibiting walk-in applications is applied equally to all groups. 27 The
practice is facially neutral and must therefore be challenged by disparate impact
analysis.
Potter will not succeed with a disparate impact claim challenging the overall
selection process 28 unless he can convince the court either (1) that the relevant
geographic market for Standard is not the metropolitan area from which employees
are actually drawn, but should be more heavily weighted to reflect the surrounding
black neighborhood, or (2) that Standard is really using a high school diploma
requirement. Both arguments are difficult and likely to fail. The first is based upon
the concept of a weighted relevant market, for which there is some precedent.29 The
cases to date, however, have all dealt with weighting the market to reflect the
geographic area from which current employees commute. Potter's theory would
reverse the argument: the recruitment practices have distorted the work force so that
the local labor market provides a more accurate comparison than the area from which
employees are actually drawn. This approach attacks the recruitment practice itself,
an argument for which there is no direct precedent.
Potter's second theory is that Standard's practices are a subterfuge for a high
school diploma requirement. Following the test established by the landmark Supreme
Court decision in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,3o Potter would introduce evidence that
26. Disparate treatment claims are based upon a showing of intentional exclusion, whereas disparate impact claims
are premised upon the disproportionate exclusion of the plaintiff's group. See supra note 5. The requirements for an
individual claim of disparate treatment were explained by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411
U.S. 792 (1973). Those plaintiff requirements are:
(i) that plaintiff belongs to a racial minority; (ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the
employer was seeking applicants; (iii) that, despite his qualifications, he was rejected; and (iv) that, after his
rejection, the position remained open and the employer continued to seek applicants from persons of
complainant's qualifications.
Id. at 802. Once the plaintiff has established these elements, the burden shifts to the employer to "articulate some
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection." Id. The reference to membership in a racial minority
in these requirements is not restrictive. See, e.g., Kamberos v. GTE Automatic Elec., Inc., 603 F.2d 598 (7th Cir. 1979)
(sex discrimination application of McDonnell Douglas criteria), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1060 (1981); Lujan v. New
Mexico Health and Social Services Dept., 624 F.2d 968 (10th Cir. 1980) (national origin discrimination application of
McDonnell Douglas criteria).
27. Group unequal treatment is a violation of the Act because an employer uses different procedures or rules for
groups defined by race, sex, or ethnicity. See, e.g., Slack v. Havens, 522 F.2d 1091 (9th Cir. 1975) (black women
workers forced to do heavy cleaning beyond normal job duties, whereas white coworker was excused from the heavy
cleaning assignment).
28. The Supreme Court introduced the disparate impact method of comparing the population to the workforce in
International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977) and in Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States,
433 U.S. 299 (1977). For an explanation of the various methods for proving disparate impact, see Shoben, Probing the
Discriminatory Effects of Employee Selection Procedures with Disparate ImpactAnalysis Under Title VII, 56 Tx. L. REv.
1 (1977).
29. Clark v. Chrysler Corp., 673 F.2d 921, 929 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 873 (1982); Markey v. Tenneco
Oil Co., 635 F.2d 497, 499-500 (5th Cir. 1981).
30. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
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the education requirement has a disparate impact on blacks. The problem with this
approach is that the company does not have an announced high school diploma
requirement. Potter's argument is that the company is imposing an education
requirement surreptitiously through its recruitment method. This theory of subterfuge
is premised upon proof of intentional discrimination, 3' which would be difficult.
Thus, unless Potter can attack the impact of the recruitment practice itself, he is
unlikely to establish a claim.
Consider another hypothetical plaintiff,3 2 Palmer, a woman who seeks employ-
ment as an airline pilot. She contacts Skytrans which, like many airlines, has
minimum height and experience requirements. Assume that Palmer herself meets
these requirements, although they have a disparate impact on women in general so
that there are very few women pilots. Palmer is unsuccessful in obtaining employ-
ment because Skytrans does not keep applications active when there are no
vacancies. 33 When a vacancy occurs, Skytrans considers only current applicants.
Word-of-mouth and occasional advertising notifies potential applicants. Palmer never
learns of a vacancy in time to apply for it. She believes that other qualified women
have the same problem with Skytrans because there are almost no women pilots in the
company.
Palmer wants to bring a Title VII suit against Skytrans. Under current law she
does not have a good claim under either disparate treatment or disparate impact
theories. Her disparate treatment claim will fail for lack of a vacancy at each time she
applied.3 4 Her disparate impact claim will fail for a number of reasons. First, she
lacks standing to challenge the specific height and experience requirements that
disproportionately exclude women.35 Moreover, there is precedent for the job-
relatedness of those requirements. 36 Second, she will have difficulty challenging the
overall hiring process by the population comparison method. Following the analysis
of the decision in Hazelwood School District v. United States,37 she would compare
the employer's work force with the relevant labor market. Again she has no claim
because the relevant labor market will be restricted to qualified pilots. The
underrepresentation of women among qualified pilots will explain the small number
of women in Skytrans' work force. 38 Palmer does not have a claim unless the
recruitment practice itself is subject to the Act.
If recruitment practices are subject to the Act, can both disparate treatment and
disparate impact theories be used? Must Palmer attack the Skytrans method by
31. Cf. Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 768 F.2d 1120 (9th Cir. 1985). See supra note 13.
32. For cases factually related to this hypothetical case, see Gay v. Waiters' and Dairy Lunchmen's Union, 694
F.2d 531 (9th Cir. 1982); EEOC v. High Top Coal Co., 508 F. Supp. 553 (E.D. Tenn. 1980), aff'd, 677 F.2d 1136 (6th
Cir. 1982). See also Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 768 F.2d 1120, 1127 n.3 (9th Cir. 1985).
33. Cf. Lowe v. City of Montovia, 755 F.2d 998 (9th Cir. 1986) (delayed eligibility lists that expire automatically
after period of time).
34. See supra note 26.
35. See generally B. Scwsz ATO P. GRoss.Ma, EmPLoM-ENr DSCRIMNATION LAw, 986-91 (2d ed. 1976).
36. See Boyd v. Ozark Air Lines, Inc., 568 F.2d 50, 53-54 (8th Cir. 1977) (height requirement for pilots upheld);
Spurlock v. United Airlines, Inc., 475 F.2d 216, 218-19 (10th Cir. 1972) (experience requirement for pilots upheld).
37. 433 U.S. 299 (1977). See supra note 28.
38. See Boyd v. Ozark Air Lines, Inc., 568 F.2d 50, 53-54 (8th Cir. 1977).
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showing that the company adopted it for the purpose of excluding women? Or is it
sufficient for her to show that the practice disproportionately excludes qualified
women?
This question was noted, but not decided, in a Ninth Circuit case, Domingo v.
New England Fish Co. 3 9 The plaintiff charged the defendant, known as Nefco, with
race discrimination against Filipinos. Nefco operates seasonal salmon canneries in
remote areas of Alaska. It hires employees from Washington, Oregon, and northern
California and transports them to the canneries. They are housed and fed there for the
canning season. Domingo brought class claims of discrimination against Nefco on
several grounds, one of which was the company's method of recruitment. Workers
for the lower-paying jobs were recruited from the native villages of Alaska and from
a predominantly Filipino union local in Seattle. The better jobs, held primarily by
whites, were filled by word-of-mouth recruiting. This division in the work force was
further perpetuated by nepotism and by the broad hiring discretion given to the
supervisors, most of whom were white. The court expressed uncertainty whether
these recruitment and hiring practices could be subjected to disparate impact analysis,
because the practices were not facially neutral. The issue was not resolved, however,
because the plaintiffs had established intentional discrimination. 40
Some of the questions left open by Domingo surfaced in a case that was
originally a Domingo companion case, Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co.41 Atonio
was another class action by nonwhites suing other salmon canneries in Alaska.
Factually the cases were very similar. The crucial legal difference between them is
that the class in Domingo successfully proved intentional discrimination against
nonwhites, but the Atonio plaintiffs failed to do so. 42 The district court found that
there was not sufficient proof that the Atonio defendants had intentionally excluded
or disadvantaged nonwhites through a variety of challenged practices, including
word-of-mouth recruitment. The Atonio plaintiffs then argued that the practices
should be analyzed under the disparate impact model. The district court refused to
apply disparate impact analysis to the hiring practices, except for the claims of
nepotism. The Ninth Circuit initially upheld this decision and ruled that disparate
impact analysis is appropriate only for facially neutral employment requirements.
Other practices and policies, including word-of-mouth recruitment, the panel said,
can be scrutinized for intentional discrimination but not evaluated for their disparate
impact.43 That opinion was vacated and new arguments have been heard en bane.
Regardless of the wisdom of limiting disparate impact analysis to facially neutral
practices, 44 doing so leaves unresolved the question of whether recruitment practices
39. 727 F.2d 1429 (9th Cir.), modified, 742 F.2d 521 (9th Cir.).
40. Id. at 1435.
41. 768 F.2d 1120 (9th Cir. 1985). See supra note 13.
42. Id. at 1125-26.
43. Id. at 1133.
44. The courts of appeals are split on this question. Disparate impact analysis has been applied to subjective criteria
in hiring by the Sixth, Eleventh, and D.C. Circuits. See Griffin v. Carlin, 755 F.2d 1516 (1 th Cir. 1985); Segar v. Smith,
738 F.2d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Rowe v. Cleveland Pneumatic Co., Numerical Control, 690 F.2d 88 (6th Cir. 1982).
The Fourth, Fifth, and Eighth Circuits have not applied disparate impact analysis to subjective criteria. See Vuyanich v.
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can ever be considered facially neutral practices. The withdrawn Atonio opinion said
that practices such as hiring from different sources or channels and word-of-mouth
recruitment were not facially neutral practices and therefore not suited for disparate
impact analysis. The panel did not define "facially neutral practices," but stated:
"Examples of the type of objective, outwardly neutral employment practices clearly
susceptible to impact scrutiny are pre-employment tests that adversely affect people
of certain cultural backgrounds and pre-selection requirements such as height and
weight restrictions. "4 These examples reflect two of the major Supreme Court cases
that employed disparate impact analysis, 46 but this restrictive view neglects to note
that the Supreme Court has also employed disparate impact analysis to make a
comparison of the employer's work force (or recent hirees) to the surrounding
population (or labor force). 47 Such comparisons encompass collectively all the kinds
of practices that the Atonio panel found unsuitable for individual scrutiny by disparate
impact analysis: hiring from different sources, word-of-mouth recruitment, lack of
well-defined hiring criteria and subjective decision making.4 8
If individual components of the hiring process are not subject to disparate impact
analysis unless they are "facially neutral practices," ' 49 then the courts must develop
criteria for determining whether a practice is in the facially neutral category. Are only
objective selection procedures in the category? The panel in Atonio offered examples
of such practices but limited them to selection devices.50 Why not include in the
facially neutral category recruitment practices such as a limitation on the sources of
applicants, a refusal to accept walk-in applications, or a limitation on the time of
application? If these practices are not individually subject to disparate impact
analysis, then they will be analyzed collectively with selection procedures for
disparate impact under the population comparison approach. 5' Plaintiffs such as the
hypothetical ones in Potter v. Standard5 2 and Palmer v. Skytrans5 3 would be unable
to establish a violation of Title VII unless they can prove intentional discrimination.
Atonio explained that the value of disparate impact analysis for facially neutral
Republic Nat'l Bank of Dallas, 723 F.2d 1195 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1073 (1984); EEOC v. Federal
Reserve Bank of Richmond, 698 F.2d 633 (4th Cir. 1983); Carroll v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 708 F.2d 183 (5th Cir.
1983); Carpenter v. Stephen F. Austin State Univ., 706 F.2d 608 (5th Cir. 1983); Talley v. United States Postal Serv.,
720 F.2d 505 (8th Cir. 1983); Pope v. City of Hickory, N.C., 679 F.2d 20 (4th Cir. 1982); Pouncy v. Prudential Ins. Co.,
668 F.2d 795 (5th Cir. 1982); Harris v. Ford Motor Co., 651 F.2d 609 (8th Cir. 1981). The Tenth Circuit has applied
disparate impact analysis in some cases and not applied it in others. See Lasso v. Woodmen of World Life Ins. Co., 741
F.2d 1241 (10th Cir. 1984) (applying the analysis); Mortensen v. Callaway, 672 F.2d 822 (10th Cir. 1982) (not applying
the analysis); Williams v. Colorado Springs, Colo. School Dist., 641 F.2d 835 (10th Cir. 1981) (applying the analysis).
The First Circuit has twice noted the split and left the issue unresolved. See Latino Unidos v. Secretary of HUD, 799 F.2d
774 (1st Cir. 1986); Robinson v. Polaroid Corp., 732 F.2d 1010 (1st Cir. 1984).
45. Atonio v. Wards Cove Packing Co., 768 F.2d 1120, 1131 (9th Cir. 1985).
46. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) (ability tests); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977)
(height requirement).
47. Hazelwood School Dist. v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. United
States, 431 U.S. 324 (1977).
48. 768 F.2d 1120, 1133 (9th Cir. 1985). See supra note 13.
49. The Circuits are split on this issue. See supra note 44. The Supreme Court has made an oblique footnote
reference to the issue. See infra note 63.
50. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
51. See supra note 47.
52. See supra text accompanying notes 22-31.
53. See supra text accompanying notes 32-38.
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practices is to attack exclusionary procedures that "by their nature make intentional
discrimination difficult or impossible to prove." ' 54 Restrictive recruitment practices
have the same character. Unless they are justified by business necessity, their
disproportionate impact on the basis of race, sex, or ethnicity should violate Title VII.
B. The Recruitment Problem in Fumco
The 1978 Supreme Court case Furnco Construction Co. v. Waters55 best
illustrates the importance of distinguishing between recruitment practices and
selection procedures and the value of disparate impact analysis for some recruitment
practices. Regrettably, the case was decided on other grounds. The case concerned
the claim of intentional discrimination in hiring, and the Court remanded it for proper
application of the McDonnell Douglas v. Green burdens. 56 Had the case been
remanded for disparate impact evidence, as the dissenting justices urged, 57 this area
of Title VII law might have been significantly clarified.
Furnco concerned an employer that specialized in relining blast furnaces in steel
mills. This construction company did not maintain a permanent work force, but hired
workers for individual contracts until each job was completed. The job superintendent
for each contract was responsible for hiring. 58
The job that became the object of this lawsuit was to reline with firebrick a blast
furnace for Interlake, Inc. Furnco's job superintendent hired bricklayers primarily
from the group of workers known to him personally-a predominantly white group.
There was also supplemental hiring of a few individuals based on management
recommendations. Most notably, this included black bricklayers hired pursuant to
Furnco's affirmative action plan. As a result, the racial composition of the work force
for the Interlake job closely reflected the racial composition of the relevant labor
market. The plaintiffs were black bricklayers who were experienced and otherwise
qualified for the job. They were not hired because they were not known personally
to the superintendent nor were they part of the supplemental hiring for the affirmative
action plan. They applied "at the gate" and were rejected on the grounds that Furnco
did not accept job-site applications. 59
Furmco's refusal to take applications at the job site is a recruitment restriction.
Recruitment practices can be either open or restrictive. Open recruiting includes
actively seeking applications through activities such as advertising, contacting public
or private employment agencies, or visiting schools. It also includes passive
acceptance of applications as they are received. A restrictive recruitment practice, on
the other hand, is a refusal to accept applications from some sources in favor of one
or more exclusive sources. The challenged practice in Furnco was the refusal to take
54. 768 F.2d 1120, 1133 (9th Cir. 1985).
55. 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
56. Id. at 576-80. See supra note 26 for an explanation of the McDonnell Douglas criteria.
57. Justice Marshall, joined byJustice Brennan, concurred in part and dissented in part. 438 U.S. 567, 581 (1978).
58. 438 U.S. 567, 569-70 (1978).
59. Id. at 570.
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applications at the gate-a restrictive practice-in favor of applicants known by or
referred to the superintendent.
For most employers, the recruitment process is a haphazard collection of open
practices, 6o often augmented by specific efforts such as an affirmative action
program. All the parts taken together make a hodge-podge whole: walk-ins,
word-of-mouth referrals, advertising respondents, referrals from employment agen-
cies, and so forth. If each were to be examined individually for any adverse impact
on groups defined by race, sex, or national origin, probably many would not pass
scrutiny. The effect of any one practice, however, is not determinative of the
applicant pool. It is the whole that is important.
Restrictive recruitment practices are distinguishable. When an employer refuses
to consider an application because of its source, then the recruitment practice amounts
to a job requirement. It is as much a requirement as an education requirement or a test
because the applicant is rejected for failure to meet an identifiable criterion-source
of application. Consequently, a restrictive recruitment practice ought to be subject to
disparate impact analysis. It should be an unlawful employment practice if disparate
impact is shown, unless the employer can defend with a claim of business necessity.
Applying these principles to Furnco would require examining the restrictive
practice of refusing to accept applications at the job site. If that practice has a
disparate impact on blacks, then the burden should shift to Fumco to establish
business necessity. If the exclusionary requirement cannot be defended, then
appropriate relief would be an injunction and restitution to those identifiably
injured. 61
The Furnco litigation did not divide the recruitment and hiring practices. Instead,
the district court considered them together and concluded there was no disparate,
impact because the affirmative action plan produced an acceptable "bottom line."
The Supreme Court did not address the bottom line issue in Furnco as it subsequently
did in Connecticut v. Teal.62 To the contrary, the recruitment practice was not
perceived as a requirement. 63 Instead Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the majority
addressed disparate treatment standards under McDonnell Douglas v. Green.
Under McDonnell Douglas analysis, a plaintiff's prima facie case requires
application for an existing job and rejection despite qualification. In Furnco the
employer conceded the plaintiffs' qualifications. 64 The defendant argued instead that
60. For a survey of the recruitment practices of 300 personnel and industrial relations executives, see Recruiting
Policies and Practices, Personnel Policies Forum (BNA), at 1-15 (July 1979).
61. Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 413-25 (1975).
62. 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
63. In a footnote the majority opinion by Justice Rehnquist observes that this case did not involve employment
tests, particularized requirements such as height and weight, or a pattern or practice claim. Fumco Constr. Co. v. Waters,
438 U.S. 567, 575 n.7 (1978). The suggestion is that other types of employment criteria should not be treated as disparate
impact cases. In contrast, the dissenting comments of Justice Marshall, joined by Justice Brennan, repeat the original
Griggs formulation that any facially neutral employment practice may be the subject of a disparate impact claim. Id. at
583 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
64. In a footnote the Court explains:
We note that this case does not raise any questions regarding exactly what sort of requirements an employer can
impose upon any particular job. Furnco has conceded that for all its purposes respondents were qualified in
every sense. Thus, with respect to the McDonnell Douglas prima facie case, the only question it places at issue
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the refusal to take job site applications had a legitimate business purpose; workers
known to the superintendent did not do slow or shoddy work. The district court
agreed with Furnco, but the Seventh Circuit reversed because the burden of accepting
job site applications was slight. The Supreme Court admonished that the defendant's
burden under McDonnell Douglas is merely to dispel the inference of intentional
discrimination. The Court added that the employer "need not prove that he pursued
the course which would both enable him to achieve his own business goal and allow
him to consider the most employment applications."- 65 The Court concluded that
employers need not adopt the best hiring procedures in order to consider more
minority applicants.
The fallacy of Furnco is the premise that the plaintiffs were qualified for the job.
They were good bricklayers, but they were not "qualified" for the Interlake job
because they did not meet the requirement of being known by or referred to the
superintendent. The concept of qualification under McDonnell Douglas has not been
defined by the Court, but surely it must encompass announced requirements.
Furnco's refusal to take applications at the gate in favor of known workers was an
acknowledged recruitment requirement which the plaintiffs failed to meet. When
plaintiffs fail to satisfy the McDonnell Douglas steps, the only alternative under Title
VII law is to demonstrate that the failed requirement has a disparate impact on
plaintiffs' group. Griggs permits a challenge to practices fair on their face but
discriminatory in operation. If the Furnco plaintiffs could show the impact of the
requirement on black bricklayers, a prima facie case under Griggs should be found.
Justice Marshall's dissent objected to the Court's apparent foreclosure of disparate
impact evidence on remand. 66 Although the majority opinion is unclear on this point,
the foreclosure apparently was caused by Fumco's concession that the plaintiffs were
qualified. 67 Instead the recruitment rule should have been analyzed as an employment
requirement.
III. RECRUITMENT PRACnCES AS REQUIREMENTS
Recruitment practices are either restricted or unrestricted. Restrictive practices
are those where the source of the application plays a role in the employment decision.
Single source recruiting, such as union referrals or promotion-from-within policies,
is one type. Refusal to accept applicants from one source while accepting from other
multiple sources is another type. The latter type of restrictive recruiting is illustrated
in the hypothetical example of Standard Company's refusal to accept Potter's walk-in
is whether its refusal to consider respondents' applications at the gate was based upon legitimate, nondiscrim-
inatory reasons and therefore permissible.
438 U.S. 567, 576 n.8 (1979).
65. Id. at 577.
66. Id. at 583-85 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
67. The remand is unclear on this point. The majority opinion notes that the parties presented alternative theories
of liability and defense not addressed by the Seventh Circuit. The Court concluded that the matters were still preserved
for appeal, but were best considered first by the circuit court. Id. at 580-81. One of those alternative theories was
discussed in an accompanying footnote. id. at 580 n.9. The dissent concludes from this footnote that other theories may
be foreclosed. Id. at 584 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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application. 68 Both types of restrictive recruitment practices are best characterized as
employment requirements. They should be analyzed as objective hiring criteria. Open
and unrestrictive recruitment, however, is an indivisible part of the overall hiring
process. Unrestricted procedures should be analyzed as part of the total hiring case,
whereas restrictive recruitment practices should be scrutinized separately and should
not be defended with "bottom line" favorable results.
A. Multiple Sources of Applicants with Unrestricted Recruiting
Employers who engage in unrestricted recruiting typically have multiple sources
of applicants.6 9 Some are actively sought and others are passively received. Active
recruiting is any deliberate effort to attract applicants: interviewing at schools,
contacting referral agencies, and so forth. Passive recruitment is simply a willingness
to accept and consider any applicant who seeks employment. A combination of active
and passive recruiting is common.
Consider hypothetical Company XYZ, which accepts walk-in applications, urges
present employees to refer friends, and conducts special minority recruiting for
affirmative action. These are active and passive methods. Assume further that,
although the company's work force has historically been all-white, recent hiring
shows racial minority representation compares favorably with the relevant labor
market.70 A minority plaintiff then brings a Title VII action on the theory that the
word-of-mouth recruiting from the predominantly white work force has a disparate
impact. Under these facts the plaintiff should not have a prima facie case.
Unrestricted recruiting from multiple sources cannot reasonably be divided into its
components. Even if one isolated practice has a separate impact, it may be offset by
another. In the absence of intentional discrimination, 7 1 Company XYZ should not be
required to justify each of these practices.
The earlier hypothetical with Standard Company72 is distinguishable. Potter's
complaint was that Standard refused to accept walk-ins. Both Company XYZ and
Standard Company have favorable bottom-line hiring figures, but Company XYZ
engages in unrestricted recruitment whereas Standard is restrictive. Anyone may
apply to Company XYZ but not to Standard. If Standard accepted all applications, a
greater proportion of minority workers might have applied to this inner-city
employer. The bottom line would then look very different.
Although the premise of this Article is that no single employment practice-
either in recruitment or in selection-should be permissible under Title VII, unless the
68. See supra text accompanying notes 20-29.
69. See Recruiting Policies and Practices, supra note 60.
70. Company XYZ's applicant flow would be a good test of its hiring practices, but special recruitment efforts may
result in disproportionate numbers of unqualified applicants in some groups. A comparison of recent hirees to the relevant
labor market is thus more appropriate. See generally Wheelerv. City of Columbus, Miss., 686 F.2d 1144 (5th Cir. 1982);
Wilkins v. University of Houston, 654 F.2d 388 (5th Cir. 1981). The Supreme Court has indicated that applicant flow
evidence should be accorded significant weight only in appropriate cases. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 330
(1977). See also New York City Transit Auth. v. Beazer, 440 U.S. 568, 584-87 (1979).
71. See Domingo v. New England Fish Co., 727 F.2d 1429 (9th Cir. 1984).
72. See supra text accompanying notes 22-31.
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defense of business necessity is established when the practice is exclusionary, 73 an
exception to that principle is reasonable for open recruiting. Each active component
of an unrestricted recruitment process, such as used by Company XYZ, is likely to
have an adverse impact on some group when viewed in isolation. The business
necessity defense is difficult to apply to open recruitment because by definition the
company has no requirement to defend. As a result, the finding of adverse impact
would amount to a per se violation of the Act. Employers could only protect
themselves by abandoning active recruitment practices in favor of passive ones. In the
absence of intentional discrimination, such a result is unjustified and inconsistent
with the purposes of the Act. 74 It suffices to examine the unrestricted recruitment in
relation to the total hiring process.
The role of recruitment in refining the relevant labor market has been noted
previously. Many courts have considered recruitment evidence for fine-tuning the
relevant labor market.75 Most notably, such evidence has been used to evaluate a
weighted labor market that accounts for the geographic distribution of actual
employees. 76 Recruitment evidence is also relevant to rebut applicant flow. Employ-
ers have successfully argued that the effect of an aggressive affirmative action
recruitment practice can cause unfavorable applicant flow data because a dispropor-
tionately high number of unqualified minority applicants may have been encouraged
to apply. 77 Plaintiffs also have successfully used recruitment evidence to challenge
applicant flow. A city police department, for example, accepted all applications, but
conducted extensive recruitment efforts in the predominantly white suburbs. The
resulting applicant pool probably contained a much larger percentage of whites than
it would have had no active recruiting been undertaken. 78
73. See infra Section V for a discussion of the business necessity defense.
74. The Supreme Court has discussed the purpose of the Act on several occasions. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S.
440, 446-55 (1982); United Steelworkers of Am. v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 201-07 (1979); Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S 424, 429-36 (1971).
75. See supra note 4.
76. See supra note 29 and cases cited therein. The discussion of this principle by the Seventh Circuit is particularly
noteworthy. In Clark v. Chrysler Corp., 673 F.2d 921 (7th Cir. 1982), the plaintiffs alleged race discrimination in
recruiting and hiring. The company relied upon word-of-mouth referrals from its predominantly white work force. It also
took referrals from the Henry County Indiana Employment Security Division (IESD). The plaintiffs claimed that failure
to take referrals from other IESD offices in other counties with higher proportions of blacks was discriminatory. They also
alleged that the eventual termination of referrals from the Henry County IESD further restricted opportunities for blacks.
The Seventh Circuit upheld the district court's finding of no impact. First, the court noted that the comparison of the work
force to the relevant labor market favored blacks. The court accepted a weighted relevant labor market that reflected the
percentage of the work force drawn from each county. The court recognized the dangers of weighting the relevant labor
market, but found no taint from recruitment practices. The court said that "taint" is determined by comparing the
percentage of black applicants to the availability of blacks in the relevant labor market. This approach is circular, the
relevant labor market is determined by whether there is taint from recruitment, and taint from recruitment is determined
by the relevant labor market. In Clark there was no problem, however, because recent hirees exceeded availability when
applying both the plaintiffs' and defendant's figures. The question thus left unresolved is how to choose a relevant labor
market for determining if recruitment taint precludes the use of a weighted relevant labor market.
77. See, e.g., Carroll v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 708 F.2d 183 (5th Cir. 1983). The defendants argued that its
effective affirmative action plan, as well as the location of its personnel office in close proximity to the State Employment
Office, resulted in a disproportionate number of unqualified black applicants. Id. at 191 n.8. The district court concluded
that these factors resulted in an artifically high number of black applicants. The court of appeals did not reach the issue
because it found no impact even at unadjusted levels. Id. at 188.
78. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. City of Santa Ana, 410 F. Supp. 873 (C.D. Cal. 1976). See also Davis
v. City of Dallas, 483 F. Supp. 54 (N.D. Tex. 1979), motion to reconsider denied with opinion, 487 F. Supp. 389 (N.D.
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In most cases involving unrestricted recruiting, the recruitment practices merge
into the hiring procedure. In those cases, the usual approaches for probing hiring
procedures encompass the unrestricted recruitment component as well. 79 Even though
active recruiting may affect the relevant market, its effects should not make a prima
facie case by themselves.
When an employer does not engage in any active recruiting but relies exclusively
on unrestrictive passive acceptance of unsolicited applications, plaintiffs rarely can
show any effect of recruitment on the applicant pool. A company's reputation for
discrimination in the past, however, may be relevant.80 Without the consideration of
this evidence, unrestricted passive recruitment would appear never to amount to a
violation of the Act regardless of its impact. Unless one posits an affirmative duty to
recruit under Title VII,8 1 passive recruiting presents no opportunity for exclusion
except for self-exclusion. The exception might be an employer's location of the
personnel office in a location other than the workplace. This type of practice should
be deemed active recruiting, however, since one would expect purely passive
acceptance of applications to be at the work site.
B. Single or Limited Sources of Applicants: Restricted Recruitment
Many employers have single or limited sources of applicants. Collective
bargaining agreements, for example, often require an employer to take union
referrals.8 2 Another common means of limiting recruiting is promotion-from-within
policies for upper level jobs.83 These methods are restrictive in that the employer
refuses to accept applications from other sources, such as walk-ins, or does not use
these sources until the primary source is exhausted. The hypothetical example of
Standard Company recruiting only from selected high schools falls into this
category, 84 as does the Furnco case.85
Tex. 1980) (women were actively recruited for police officer jobs, but few applied; the court concluded that applicant
flow was appropriate because relatively few women were interested in police work during the relevant time period.).
79. It is noteworthy that there was a recruitment component in the Supreme Court case, Hazelwood School Dist.
v. United States, 433 U.S. 299 (1977). The school district accepted all applications, but also engaged in active recruiting
at colleges. One of the facts alleged to support the claim of intentional discrimination was that the school district recruited
only at colleges attended primarily by whites and ignored two teachers' colleges with predominantly black enrollment. Id.
at 303 n.4.
80. Also relevant is the adverse effect of announced exclusionary selection standards, such as height and weight
requirements, on the applicant pool. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321, 330 (1977); Donnell v. General Motors
Corp., 576 F.2d 1292, 1298 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 844 (1982).
81. This position was advocated in an early article. See Blumrosen, The Duty of Fair Recruitment Under the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 22 Rtrro.s L. Rsv. 465 (1968).
82. See, e.g., Mills v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 634 F.2d 282, 284 (5th Cir. 1981); EEOC v. Enterprise
Ass'n Steamfitters Local 638, 542 F.2d 579, 588-89 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 911 (1977); Kaplan v.
International Alliance of Theatrical and Stage Employees, Local 659, 525 F.2d 1354, 1355 (9th Cir. 1975); Gay v.
Waiters' and Dairy Lunchmen's Union, Local 30, 489 F. Supp. 282,288-89 (N.D. Cal. 1980), aff'd, 694 F.2d 531 (9th
Cir. 1982); Pennsylvania v. Local Union 542, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 469 F. Supp. 329, 337-39 (E.D. Pa.
1978), aff'd, 648 F.2d 922 (3rd Cir. 1981), rev'd, 458 U.S. 375 (1982).
83. See, e.g., Johnson v. Uncle Ben's, Inc., 628 F.2d 419, 425-26 (5th Cir. 1980), vacated, 451 U.S. 902,
modified and aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 657 F.2d 750 (5th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 967 (1982); Donnell v.
General Motors Corp., 576 F.2d 1292 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 844 (1982); Gates v. Georgia-Pacific Corp.,
326 F. Supp. 397, 398 (D.C. Ore. 1970), aff'd, 492 F.2d 292 (9th Cir. 1974).
84. See supra text accompanying notes 22-31.
85. See supra text accompanying notes 55-67.
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A requirement that applicants come from particular sources is an objective
practice like any other hiring requirement and should be subject to the same legal
analysis as other requirements. If restrictive recruiting has a disparate impact, then an
employer should have the burden of establishing business necessity, just as with a
height requirement or written test. 86
A case example involving restrictive recruitment is EEOC v. The New York
Times Broadcasting Service, Inc.87 In that case, a woman alleged sex discrimination
in the hiring of writer-reporters and announcers at WREC-TV. This television station
recruited primarily from a radio station, WREC, with whom it had formerly been
affiliated. Neither the radio station nor the television station had ever hired a female
announcer, and only one female reporter-writer had ever been employed. The court
found that the employment procedure had a disparate impact on the basis of sex. The
station argued the business necessity of the prior radio broadcasting experience. The
court rejected this defense because there were alternative sources of applicants with
the same experience. There was nothing unique about the radio experience obtained
at the restricted source, WREC radio. 88
Single source recruiting pursuant to a collective bargaining agreement poses a
slightly different problem. If the employer has committed to hire from a union list,
the union becomes the hiring agent. In the Title VII context, the employer should be
liable for the practices of the hiring agent. If the agent discriminates intentionally and
directly on behalf of an employer, there should be liability. 89 The more difficult
question is whether an employer should be accountable for union practices that have
a disparate impact. Since the agreement to hire from the union is a restrictive
recruitment practice, the employer should be required to show the business necessity
of the exclusionary union practices. The potential joint liability of employers and
unions for recruitment practices with a disparate impact should encourage greater
scrutiny of those procedures. Any other result allows the employer to hide behind the
practices of its agent.
An example of this problem is Kaplan v. International Alliance of Theatrical
and Stage Employees.90 The plaintiff was a photographer desirous of work with
motion picture and television producers. The employers had collective bargaining
agreements with the union representing members of theatrical and television crafts.
The agreement required employers to give preference to individuals on the union's
86. But see supra note 63 for discussion of the footnote in Furnco which suggests a limitation on practices subject
to the disparate impact approach. One district court has relied on that footnote to conclude that an "as needed" hiring
practice was not a practice subject to Griggs. EEOC v. High Top Coal Co., 508 F. Supp. 553, 556-57 (E.D. Tenn. 1981),
aff'd, 677 F.2d 1136 (6th Cir. 1982).
87. 542 F.2d 356 (6th Cir. 1976).
88. The lack of any special character of the WREC radio experience was shown by the fact that the defendant hired
successfully from other sources after the filing of the complaint. Id. at 361.
89. On the subject of joint union-management liability for violations of Title VII, see generally C. SuLUvA, M.
Zeram & R. RammsAs, FrnmAL STATUORY LAw op F_.PIovs.Nr DImiNATION 254-58 (1980) [hereinafter FmERA. STATrIORY
Lwl. But see EEOC v. Local 14, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 553 F.2d 251 (2d Cir. 1977) (employer contractors
joined for purposes of relief only in action against union); United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, Local 36,
416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969) (trade association of employers not liable for back pay where there was no specific finding
of discrimination independent of the union's intentional discrimination).
90. 525 F.2d 1354 (9th Cir. 1975).
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Industry Experience Roster. A listing on the roster was possible only through
experience and union membership. The female plaintiff had gained experience but
not union membership, and thus was not on the roster. She successfully sued the
union for intentional sex discrimination under Title VII.91 Although she did not sue
any producers, they should have been liable on a disparate impact theory for the use
of a single recruitment source that disproportionately excluded women.
Promotion-from-within policies are another type of single source recruiting. 92
When an employer fills upper level jobs primarily through promotions from lower
level jobs, the pool of applicants for the higher job is restricted. When that pool is not
representative of the composition of the relevant labor market, the policy is
exclusionary. The burden should shift to the employer to show the business necessity
of this restrictive recruitment policy for promotions.
C. Prohibited Sources of Applicants
Employers using multiple sources of applicants, but refusing to accept applica-
tions from a particular source, are also engaging in restrictive recruiting. A
willingness to accept applicants who are referred from any source, but not walk-in
self-referrals, is one example. The practice of the hypothetical company Skytrans
described earlier is another example. 93 Skytrans accepted any applications that
arrived from any source, but only at specified times. It refused to accept applications
when there were no openings. This time constraint creates a prohibited source of
applicants; applications made before job vacancies are excluded unless the applicant
knows to reapply. This type of restrictive recruiting is another employment
requirement-exact time of application-and should also be subject to disparate
impact analysis. If the plaintiff demonstrates impact, the burden should shift to the
employer to demonstrate the business necessity of the restricted acceptance of
applications.
The plaintiff's proof of disparate impact in this category would be particularly
difficult. The plaintiff who wished to challenge only the recruitment restriction rather
than the entire hiring procedure would need to show that refusal to retain applications
adversely affected plaintiff's group. In the Skytrans example, Palmer would need to
prove that qualified women were disproportionately excluded by failure to retain
applications for some reasonable period of time. The impact proof would be difficult,
but a plaintiff should not be foreclosed from presenting it.94 The time-of-application
91. See also United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n, Local 36, 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969).
92. See Wilmore v. City of Wilmington, 699 F.2d 667, 668-69 (3rd Cir. 1983).
93. See supra text accompanying notes 32-38.
94. Recall that in the Skytrans hypothetical, as in Furnco, the employer's work force did not show underrepresenta-
tion of the plaintiff's group compared with the relevant population. An attack of the recruitment procedure is then based
upon the assumption that, absent discriminatory recruiting, members of plaintiff's group would be interested and qualified
for this work at a level higher than their representation in the relevant labor market. For cases in which similar arguments
have been made, see EEOC v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 635 F.2d 188 (3d Cir. 1980); Davis v. City of Dallas, 483 F. Supp.
54 (N.D. Tex. 1979), motion to reconsider denied with opinion, 487 F. Supp. 389 (N.D. Tex. 1980). Recall also that
Skytrans can defend by showing the validation of its employment requirements. The underrepresentation of plaintiff's
group is not unlawful when it results from valid selection criteria. See Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405
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restriction is an employment requirement like any other qualification and therefore
should be subject to Title VII analysis.
IV. AGGREGATED RECRUITMENT PRAcrIcEs: THE BoTroM LINE DEFENSE
Is any disparate impact of recruitment practices unimportant if the "bottom
line" of recent hirees compares favorably with the relevant labor market? Is all this
fuss about recruitment irrelevant as long as the employer has a representative work
force? The premise of this Article is that restrictive recruitment practices are specific
employment requirements. Therefore, the bottom line should not be a defense.
Following the Supreme Court's 1982 decision in Connecticut v. Teal,95 the bottom
line is not a defense in cases where an unvalidated hiring requirement has an
impact. 96 It is not sufficient for one requirement to offset another to create a
representative work force. The Court reasoned that Title VII protects individuals from
exclusionary practices that are not justified by business necessity. 97 Individuals rather
than groups are protected by the Act. 98
In the recruitment context, restrictive and unrestrictive practices must again be
distinguished. Restrictive recruitment practices are equivalent to requirements;
unrestricted practices are not. When an employer recruits restrictively, applicants are
not considered unless they have come from an approved source or have not come
from an unapproved source. Unrestricted recruiting, on the other hand, is an
employer's willingness to accept applicants from all sources. Such recruiting can be
both active and passive. The employer may make special efforts to attract workers,
but also accept self-referrals. A favorable bottom line should be a defense for
unrestricted recruiting because no single practice is an employment requirement. The
adverse effect of any one practice may be offset by another. Conversely, restrictive
practices may permanently exclude individuals unfairly because the employer will not
consider applications made at some times or through some channels. 99 The burden on
the employer should then be to establish business necessity.
(1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Therefore the plaintiff would want to challenge the restrictive
recruitment practice separately.
95. 457 U.S. 440 (1982).
96. Id. at 442-45.
97. Id. at 453-54.
98. See also Wilmore v. City of Wilmington, 699 F.2d 667 (3d Cir. 1983) (without discriminatory assignments
precluding administrative experience, minorities would have fared even better because of superior group performance at
oral interview). See also supra note 13.
99. See Greenspan v. Automobile Club of Mich., 495 F. Supp. 1021 (E.D. Mich. 1980). Compare the unusual
requirement in EEOC v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 635 F.2d 188 (3d Cir. 1980). Plaintiff challenged the employer bus
company's rule prohibiting facial hair as discriminatory against blacks. There was no direct proof that such a policy
adversely affects blacks; the only proof was that black males disproportionately suffer from a skin disease requiring them
to grow beards. The court relied upon the fact that blacks were well represented in the company compared with the
relevant labor market. The dissent objected to the bottom line approach and noted that it "would establish by judicial fiat
an invidious quota defense." 635 F.2d 188, 196-97 (Sloviter, J., dissenting). This case, which preceded Teal, appears
to be accepting a bottom line defense.
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
V. BusiNEss NECESSITY FOR RESTRICTIVE RECRUITING
In Furnco the district court found that the employer's refusal to hire at the gate
had a legitimate business purpose, thus answering the plaintiff's disparate treatment
claim under McDonnell Douglas.00 That purpose was the necessity of insuring that
only highly qualified and experienced bricklayers were on the job to avoid shoddy or
slow work. The risk of future maintenance costs, damage to Furnco's reputation for
poor work, and safety hazards were also cited. The court of appeals reversed because
the employer could have adopted other reasonable procedures to accept applicants
while meeting these goals. 101 The Supreme Court reversed the court of appeals and
said the court had gone too far in substituting its own business judgment for that of
the employer. 102 The Supreme Court opinion emphasized the proper burdens in a
disparate treatment type of case. 103
A disparate impact type of case, however, requires a different defense. A prima
facie case of disproportionate exclusion triggers the Griggs requirement that the
employer demonstrate the business necessity for the exclusionary practice. In cases
concerning selection criteria such as tests or height requirements, the employer's
burden is to show the job-relatedness of each selection criterion. 04 For other types of
employment conditions, such as restrictive recruitment, the nature of the required
proof is less clear.
The line of cases concerning garnishment discharge rules provides some insight
into the business necessity defense for employment conditions unrelated to selection.
In Johnson v. Pike Corp. of America ,105 the employer had a policy of discharging
employees whose wages had been garnished. The plaintiff established that the policy
had a disparate impact on the basis of race. The employer cited expense and
inconvenience as its business necessity for the rule, but the district court rejected
these grounds. The opinion limited the business necessity defense to job-relatedness
and concluded that there is "no room for arguments regarding inconvenience,
annoyance or even expense to the employer."' 106 Another garnishment discharge
case, Wallace v. Debron Corp. ,107 did not limit the concept of business necessity to
job-relatedness as completely as the Johnson opinion. In Wallace the Eighth Circuit
tied the concept of business necessity to "employee productivity."'' 0 8
Applying these concepts to other employment practices not related to selection
of applicants, such as restrictive recruitment, is difficult. If business necessity
requires a showing of job-relatedness, prohibitory recruitment requirements would be
virtually incapable of meeting the standard. The refusal to accept applications from
100. Waters v. Furnco Constr. Corp., 13 Fair Empl. Prac. Cas. (BNA) 1020, 1024 (N.D. Il. 1975).
101. Waters v. Furnco Constr. Corp., 551 F.2d 1085, 1088-89 (1977).
102. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 569-74 (1978).
103. See supra notes 64 and 65 and accompanying text.
104. On the difference between job-relatedness and business necessity, see generally FEDR AL SrAUroRY Lsw, supra
note 89, at 53-56.
105. 332 F. Supp. 490 (C.D. Cal. 1971).
106. Id. at 495.
107. 494 F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1974).
108. Id. at 677.
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a specific source, such as refusing to hire walk-ins, would usually be based upon
considerations of expense or annoyance. Single source recruiting may often be
justified as job-related, however, because such recruitment is frequently a form of
experience requirement. 0 9 If, for example, WREC-TV could show that experience
with WREC radio was a unique background that directly related to a worker's ability
to do a job with WREC-TV, then the recruitment requirement would be justified as
job-related.
A less stringent interpretation of the business necessity defense would make
other restrictive recruitment practices defensible. One early case identified factors
such as whether the challenged practice effectively carries out its purported purpose,
and whether the same function could be accomplished with a practice having a lesser
impact.110 These factors resemble the ones considered by the court of appeals in
Furnco. The Supreme Court rejected them in the context of showing legitimate
business purpose in rebuttal of an inference of intentional discrimination, but did not
discuss them in the context of business necessity.
Furnco does make clear, however, that Title VII does not impose a duty on
employers to engage in active recruitment of minorities in the absence of a finding of
prior unlawful conduct. This analysis is consistent with prior case law holding that an
employer need not undertake a training program for minorities to offset the
exclusionary effect of an experience requirement." At that level, cost and
inconvenience do become a defense.
A reasonable application of the business necessity defense for recruitment
practices would need to be broader than the job-relatedness standard. Cost should not
be disregarded in this context. Consider, for example, a small employer, Company
Q, which processes very few applications per year and does not accept unsolicited
applications. Instead, Company Q only takes referrals from one employment agency.
Under the model proposed in this Article, a plaintiff should be able to establish a
prima facie case under Title VII if this restrictive recruitment practice has a disparate
impact on a group protected by the Act. It would not be sufficient for the employer
to rebut by showing a representative work force accomplished through a supplemental
affirmative action plan, nor would it be sufficient for the employer to defend by
demonstrating the job-relatedness of the selection criteria. Company Q would argue
that the cost of accepting unsolicited applications would be prohibitive, possibly
requiring additional personnel and office space. For a very large employer who
processes hundreds of applications a year, the additional cost of open recruiting may
also be great, but not a large percentage increase in the overall cost of processing
applications.
Cost and convenience should be factors considered in the application of the
business necessity defense to recruitment practices. The cost factor should be a
109. One such form is single source recruiting from apprenticeship programs. If admission to such training is
exclusionary, then the source of workers will reflect that effect. See, e.g., Hameed v. International Ass'n of Bridge,
Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers, Local 396, 637 F.2d 506 (8th Cir. 1980).
110. Robinson v. Lorillard Corp., 444 F.2d 791, 798 (4th Cir. 1971), cert. dismissed, 404 U.S. 1006 (1971).
111. See United States v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l Ass'n. Local 36. 416 F.2d 123 (8th Cir. 1969).
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relative concept, such as the projected percentage increase in the employer's cost of
recruitment and selection. Equally relevant, however, should be the absolute expense
of processing each application in terms of applying the selection criteria. Consider the
employer who has responded to employment discrimination law by adopting
sophisticated testing procedures, such as a job simulation experience, to establish
criteria that validly predict job performance. The absolute cost of processing each
applicant may then be high, and therefore a percentage increase approach to
evaluating the employer's projected increased cost of open recruiting may be
unjustified. Another factor that might reasonably be considered would be the
magnitude of the impact of the recruitment practice compared with the cost of open
recruiting. Cost and inconvenience should not automatically satisfy the business
necessity defense, but they should not be totally disregarded.
A liberal application of the business necessity defense is more justified for
recruitment practices than for selection criteria. Validation is not a meaningful
concept for recruitment except for practices that operate as experience requirements.
Otherwise, the function of recruitment practices is not to predict job performance but
to communicate and attract prospective employees. A rational employer considers the
prediction of job performance when establishing selection procedures; the same
rational employer considers expense, convenience, and effectiveness in attracting
qualified candidates when establishing recruitment practices. The business necessity
defense should reflect these separate functions. Cost, inconvenience, and the
availability of alternative effective recruitment methods should all be relevant factors
for the defense.
VI. CONCLUSION
Recruitment practices should be analyzed as separate components of selection
procedures under employment discrimination law. Some cases have already recog-
nized that intentional exclusion through recruitment can be a violation of Title VII,
but plaintiffs should not be required to demonstrate intent in all cases. Courts should
recognize that restrictive recruitment practices are hiring requirements. Accordingly,
they should be subject to the same analysis as other hiring requirements. If the
restrictive practice has a disparate impact, the employer should show business
necessity. The bottom line defense should not be available for restrictive recruitment
practices in the aggregate just as it is not available for selection practices. This Article
has argued that the business necessity defense should be broadly construed for
recruitment practices. Cost, inconvenience, and the availability of other effective
recruitment procedures should all be relevant to the defense.
This Article urges recognition of the distinction between restrictive and
unrestrictive recruitment practices. Although restricted recruiting amounts to an
employment requirement, unrestricted recruiting does not. Unrestricted practices,
both active and passive, should not be subject to disparate impact analysis.
Employers who accept and consider all applications from whatever source have no
requirement that applicants come from particular sources. No individual is automat-
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ically foreclosed. Even though some active recruitment may have an impact, such as
interviewing at schools with identifiable racial character, that impact should not shift
the burden to the defendant to show business necessity. All unrestricted recruitment
practices in the aggregate make the applicant pool. In such cases the entire
recruitment and selection procedure can be analyzed together. If intentional discrim-
ination motivated the employer to engage in some active recruitment, however, then
the burden should shift to show a defense such as a bona fide affirmative action plan.
Absent impermissible intent to exclude, employers should be free to engage in active
and passive recruiting as long as they remain willing to accept and consider all
applications from all sources.
The case law in this area of employment discrimination needs clarification. The
Ninth Circuit has expressed uncertainty as to whether intent must be shown in
recruitment cases. "12 The Supreme Court did not analyze Furnco Construction Co. v.
Watersn 3 as a recruitment case because it developed the posture of a hiring case.
Future cases should distinguish recruitment from hiring. The purpose of Title VII, as
articulated in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,114 compels that recruitment methods be
recognized as separate employment practices. When those practices are restrictive so
that the source of an application determines whether the individual is considered for
employment, they can operate as "built-in headwinds" that deny equal opportunity
in employment.11 5 Absent a business necessity for a restrictive recruitment practice
that is exclusionary, it should be a violation of the Act regardless of the employer's
good faith or the character of the employer's work force.
112. See supra notes 9-13 and accompanying text.
113. 438 U.S. 567 (1978).
114. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
115. Id. at 432.

